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Abstract 
Background: Deception can distort psychological tests on socially sensitive topics. Understanding the cerebral 
processes that are involved in such faking can be useful in detection and prevention of deception. Previous research 
shows that faking a brief implicit association test (BIAT) evokes a characteristic ERP response. It is not yet known 
whether temporarily available self-control resources moderate this response. We randomly assigned 22 participants 
(15 females, 24.23 ± 2.91 years old) to a counterbalanced repeated-measurements design. Participants first com-
pleted a Brief-IAT (BIAT) on doping attitudes as a baseline measure and were then instructed to fake a negative dop-
ing attitude both when self-control resources were depleted and non-depleted. Cerebral activity during BIAT perfor-
mance was assessed using high-density EEG.
Results: Compared to the baseline BIAT, event-related potentials showed a first interaction at the parietal P1, 
while significant post hoc differences were found only at the later occurring late positive potential. Here, signifi-
cantly decreased amplitudes were recorded for ‘normal’ faking, but not in the depletion condition. In source space, 
enhanced activity was found for ‘normal’ faking in the bilateral temporoparietal junction. Behaviorally, participants 
were successful in faking the BIAT successfully in both conditions.
Conclusions: Results indicate that temporarily available self-control resources do not affect overt faking success on 
a BIAT. However, differences were found on an electrophysiological level. This indicates that while on a phenotypical 
level self-control resources play a negligible role in deliberate test faking the underlying cerebral processes are mark-
edly different.
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Background
Test faking is a widespread problem especially when 
the content of human feelings and thought shall be 
explored [1]. Socially sensitive topics (e.g., stereotyp-
ing, racism, doping) are particularly vulnerable to fak-
ing. For example, athletes’ attitudes toward doping that 
were assessed via self-report measures have shown to be 
affected by deceptive responses [2]. These authors illus-
trated that athletes’ self-reported doping attitudes should 
be considered severely skewed towards the socially 
desired ‘no to doping in sports’. Reaction-time based 
indirect tests like the Implicit Association Test [IAT; 3] 
have been introduced with the promise of being more 
robust towards deception attempts [4]. There is solid 
evidence that IAT’s generally outperform traditional 
self-report measures when socially sensitive topics need 
to be assessed [5, 6]. Recently a doping Brief IAT (BIAT) 
has been developed that showed to be a valid predic-
tor of biochemical doping test results [7]. One reason 
for this might be that compared to direct tests IAT’s are 
thought to be superior in hiding the true measurement 
goal (i.e., participants are not directly asked about their 
attitude towards a certain topic). Typically, these tests 
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are presented as lexical sorting tasks on a computer, 
where two concepts (one target and one evaluative) are 
mapped on the same response key of the keyboard and 
participants are requested to respond as fast as possible. 
The task is easier and reaction times are faster when the 
two concepts sharing the same response key (e.g., doping 
and dislike) are closely associated than when they are not 
associated (e.g., doping and like).
However, even IAT’s can be faked to some extent; 
even more if participants had the opportunity to famil-
iarize themselves with the procedure at least once [8]. 
Research indicates that participants who were provided 
with an explicit faking strategy were more successful 
at faking than participants who were simply instructed 
to find a way to ‘trick the test’ [8–12]. One major rea-
son why faking IATs has sparked scientific interest is 
very practical: Test takers whose motivation to disguise 
their true attitude is high (for example towards doping 
in sports) will most likely begin to think about (and try) 
deception strategies. However, a recent study finds that 
in more realistic setting, i.e., when participants were 
only implicitly incentivized to fake doping attitude tests, 
faking occurred on self-reported measures but not on 
the BIAT [6]. Research is needed to identify the cogni-
tive processes that facilitate (or inhibit) participants’ fak-
ing success. Studying the electrophysiological correlates 
underneath these processes helps to understand how 
(and drawing upon which resources) participants fake 
such response time-based tests. Using electroencepha-
lography’s (EEG) very high time resolution of event-
related potentials (ERPs) enables to investigate very early 
cortical processes during faking.
Cortical processes of test faking
So far, most ERP research on test faking focused on 
forced choice test formats [13–16]. Some studies found 
larger very early frontal negativity [16] and an occipital 
positivity [14] for faking. Such early effects [16] have also 
been attributed partly to the blocked designs used in this 
research where participants had the opportunity to pre-
pare themselves for giving an appropriate faked answer 
[17]. Consistently, for designs using an equal number of 
stimuli in the faking and non-faking condition, a reduced 
late positivity has been found, starting at the P300 [13–
16, 18, 19].
This is thought to reflect a form of cognitive con-
trol, where participants have to exert self-control [14]. 
Recently ERP patterns were investigated while partici-
pants that were provided with an effective faking strat-
egy faked a validated doping brief implicit association 
test [BIAT, 17]. Here, significant differences were found 
between faking and non-faking at early and late time 
points. An enlarged early frontal negativity and occipital 
positivity was found as well as a decreased P300/LPP 
component [17]. Source analyses revealed significantly 
more activity in the right inferior frontal gyrus and the 
bilateral temporo-parietal junction for faking com-
pared to baseline blocks. Among other processes the 
right inferior frontal gyrus is involved in memory and 
motor inhibition [20–23] which suggests an inhibition 
of a prepotent motor response to the target stimulus. 
The enhanced activity for faking in the temporo-pari-
etal junction was thought to reflect the monitoring on 
faking and faking success. For these middle temporal/
occipital regions enhanced activity is also found in an 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study on 
lying [24]. To conclude, the act of suppressing a predomi-
nant response tendency (i.e., non-faking response) and 
substituting it with an experimentally required response 
(i.e., faking response) is an act of inhibitory cognitive 
control or self-control [25]. To our current knowledge 
there seems to be no specific ‘faking’ component visible 
in ERPs [14]. Individual differences in temporarily avail-
able self-control resources might affect how the cerebral 
response to such faking demands is and therefore partly 
explain the lack of a specific ‘faking’ component.
Ego depletion as a cognitive moderator of the cerebral 
faking response
According to the strength model of self-control [26], 
the ability to volitionally inhibit predominant response 
tendencies is an act of self-control which is relies on 
the temporary availability of self-control strength. 
Baumeister and colleagues argue that all self-control 
acts e.g., emotion regulation [27] and attention regu-
lation [28] are energized by one global resource, i.e., a 
metaphorical strength with limited capacity. Self-control 
strength can be depleted after a primary self-control act 
(i.e., ego depletion) and is not replenished immediately. 
Thus, in a state of ego depletion, less self-control strength 
is available for subsequent acts of self-control. This can 
negatively affect performance on tasks that require self-
control. Previous research has shown that the ability to 
suppress unwanted thoughts or attitudes (e.g., stereo-
types) depends on self-control strength [29]. Therefore, 
we assume that faking also requires self-control strength. 
It has to be noted, that the strength models’ propositions 
have been questioned lately [30]. Specifically, it has been 
argued that the estimated ego-depletion effect size might 
have been overestimated [30]. A Registered Replication 
Report is currently underway to investigate the size of the 
ego-depletion effect and to shed further light on this phe-
nomenon (https://osf.io/jymhe/).
Still, neuroscientific research has provided some sup-
port for the strength model of self-control. For instance, 
depleted participants displayed weaker error related 
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negativity (ERN) signals while they performed a self-con-
trol task [31]. Although neuroscientific findings of deple-
tion effects have been found to be somewhat inconsistent 
[32], one expectation of ego depletion effects is a reduc-
tion of activity within some parts of executive networks 
[32]. Specifically, Friese et al. [33] found that ego deple-
tion was associated with an activity decrease in the right 
lateral prefrontal cortex, an area which is responsible for 
the effortful implementation of control.
The present research
Our study is motivated by the idea that in test faking, 
participants have to voluntarily inhibit a predominant 
or at least more ‘automatic’ response tendency (i.e., tell-
ing the truth). It is thus reasonable to assume that fak-
ing draws upon self-control resources. Faking research 
has not been linked with research on ego depletion yet 
and no study addressed how neurophysiological faking 
correlates differ as a function of the available self-control 
resources.
We hypothesize that ego depletion leads to a decreased 
ability to exert cognitive control [34]. We thus expect a 
distinctive ERP response for IAT faking under ego deple-
tion compared to IAT faking when participants are not 
depleted. Further, we aim at extending previous find-
ings on instructed BIAT faking by investigating the ERP 
response for non-depleted BIAT faking when partici-
pants have to search for an effective faking strategy them-
selves. For faking without an explicit strategy provided 
we expect similar ERP differences as for faking with an 
explicit strategy [17]. Namely, we expect an early fron-
tal negativity and occipital positivity, and a subsequent 
decrease in the late components for faking. Further, in 
source space we expect more activity for faking in the 
right-inferior frontal gyrus and the bilateral temporopa-
rietal junction (TPJ). Finally, we expect that for faking 
under ego depletion these differences should be reduced 
or even absent.
Methods
In line with suggestions of Simmonset al. [35] “we report 
how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, 
all manipulations, and all measures in the study.” All data 
are uploaded in Additional file  1, Additional file  2 and 
Additional file 3.
Participants
Twenty-four participants were recruited at the Univer-
sity of Bielefeld. We aimed for the same sample size as in 
the previous study on IAT faking [17] in order to increase 
comparability of results and because both studies are 
closely comparable in the experimental design. They gave 
written informed consent according to the Declaration of 
Helsinki and the study was approved by the ethics com-
mittee of the University of Bielefeld. Two participants 
were excluded due to excessive artifacts (both >50 % bad 
trials) leaving 22 participants for final analyses. These 22 
participants (15 females) were 24.23  years old on aver-
age (SD =  2.91, Min =  21, Max =  31) and had normal 
or corrected to normal vision. Screenings with the Ger-
man version of the Beck Depression Inventory and the 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory [36, 37], revealed neither 
clinically relevant depression symptoms (M  =  3.55, 
SD =  3.54) nor pathological anxiety scores (M =  34.73; 
SD = 5.12). No participant reported previous or current 
diagnosed mental or neurological disorders. One subject 
was left handed.
Design/procedure
The participants’ ability to fake a negative doping attitude 
in an ego depleted versus non-depleted state was tested 
in a counterbalanced within-group (repeated measures) 
experimental design (Fig.  1). All participants completed 
a practice doping BIAT in order to familiarize them-
selves with the task [38]. This BIAT was excluded from 
subsequent analyses. As a baseline measure of their dop-
ing attitude, participants then completed another dop-
ing BIAT. They were then randomized to either the ‘ego 
Fig. 1 The experimental design. Participants completed a total of 
four BIAT‘s. The first two BIAT‘s were completed with the standard 
instructions and the last two BIAT‘s were completed with the instruc-
tion to fake a negative doping attitude. Faking under ego depletion 
was operationalized by an incongruent Stroop preceding a BIAT (dark 
grey area) and ‘normal’ faking was operationalized by a congruent 
Stroop task preceding a BIAT (light grey area). aThe practice BIAT 
consisted of 20 discrimination trials; and 20 trials in each of the dop-
ing + like and the doping + dislike blocks. bThe discrimination block 
was removed for the subsequent BIAT‘s and the doping + like and 
doping + dislike blocks were increased to 40 trials each
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depletion’ or to a ‘non-depletion’ condition and com-
pleted the respective tasks. Immediately after the manip-
ulation both groups were asked to complete another 
doping BIAT and were instructed to fake the test in a 
way that they appeared strongly anti-doping. Participants 
were asked to find their own way to “trick” the test (An 
effective way to trick the test is to deliberately delay the 
response in the doping + like block and to respond with 
full effort in the doping +  dislike block [8, 11, 12, 17]). 
Research has shown that significant resource replenish-
ment occurs within 5  min [39]. Therefore, after a break 
of 5 min the order was reversed: Participants who were 
depleted in the first sequence of the experiment were not 
depleted in the second sequence (and vice versa). Again, 
all participants were asked to fake the final doping BIAT 
in a way that they appeared strongly anti-doping. Manip-
ulation checks whether or not participants perceived the 
depletion task as more depleting than the control condi-
tion were performed before both BIAT measurements. 
All experimental stimuli were programmed and run 
using Inquisit 3.0 experimental software (www.millisec-
ond.com).
Measures
Biat
Doping attitudes were assessed with a validated picto-
rial doping BIAT [40]. The practice BIAT consisted of 
a discrimination block (20 trials) where participants 
learned to discriminate the doping stimuli from the non-
focal health food stimuli using the ‘R’ and ‘I’ keys on the 
computers keyboard. Then the compatible block (dop-
ing  +  dislike, 20 trials) was presented, followed by the 
incompatible block (doping +  like, 20 trials). The order 
of compatible and incompatible blocks was counterbal-
anced between participants to avoid positioning effects. 
In the following BIAT’s, the discrimination block was 
removed and compatible and incompatible blocks were 
expanded to 40 trials each. This BIAT is identical to the 
one introduced by Brand, Heck and Ziegler [40] with 
the exception that (a) we expanded the blocks of interest 
to 40 trials to get an adequate number of trials per cell 
for ERP averaging and (b) set the inter-trial-interval to 
1000 ms in order to avoid introducing artifacts into the 
EEG measure.
Pictures of syringes, ampules, and pills represented the 
focal ‘doping’ concept; pictures of apples, vegetables, and 
cereal stood for the ‘health food’ concept. The ‘like’ and 
‘dislike’ concepts were represented by positive and nega-
tive Emoticons. D-scores are calculated according to the 
D4 algorithm such that negative scores represent a nega-
tive attitude towards doping [41]. This means that reac-
tion times of error trials, and those exceeding 10,000 ms 
are deleted and replaced by an error value (average 
reaction time of this participant in all correct trials of the 
block plus an error penalty of 600 ms; mere elimination 
of error trials would have a negative impact on the reli-
ability of the test).
Ego depletion manipulation
A computerized Stroop task [42] was used to induce 
ego depletion. This task has been frequently applied to 
experimentally manipulate self-control strength [43, 44]. 
In this task the participants see a color word on a com-
puter screen. The font color in which the word is written 
either does match its semantic meaning (i.e., congruent 
trial; e.g., “blue” written in blue color) or it does not (i.e., 
incongruent trial; e.g., “blue” written in red color). Partic-
ipants have to name the font color and not the semantic 
meaning of the color word. This requires the exertion of 
self-control as one has to volitionally override the auto-
matic tendency to name the color word [44].
In our study participants indicated the font color of 
each word by pressing the respectively labeled key on a 
computer keyboard as fast and accurate as possible. All 
participants completed 30 practice trials (15 congru-
ent, 15 incongruent) to get familiarized with the task 
first. Then, participants in the ego depletion condition 
performed the depleting Stroop task, which consisted 
of 40 congruent and 40 incongruent trials (order ran-
domized). Participants in the non-depletion condition 
performed the non-depleting version of the Stroop 
task which consisted of 80 congruent trials (order 
randomized).
Manipulation check and control variables
In order to assess the degree of self-control participants 
had to exert while working on the task, participants 
answered three items (e.g., “How mentally exhausting did 
you find the Stroop task?”; after depletion: α = 76; after 
non-depletion: α  =  .51). To control for differences in 
motivation participants answered three items (e.g., “How 
motivated were you to do well in the Stroop task?”; after 
depletion: α = 90; after non-depletion: α = .97). All items 
had to be answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale with 
answers ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much.
As mood can affect performance on self-control tasks 
it is routinely controlled for in self-control research 
[e.g., 43, 45]. We administered the German version of 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS; 46]. 
Participants indicated their positive affect (10 items; e.g., 
“strong”; after depletion: α  =  89; after non-depletion: 
α  =  .89) as well as their negative affect (10 items; e.g., 
“anxious”; after depletion: α  =  75; after non-depletion: 
α =  .63). Items had to be answered on a 5-point Likert-
type scale with answers ranging from 1 =  not at all to 
5 = very much.
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Indicating that our ego depletion manipulation worked, 
participants perceived the depletion task to be more 
depleting compared to the control task [Mdepletion-non 
depletion = 0.64; t(20) = −2.54, p = .019, d = 0.56; 95 % CI 
+0.11 to +1.16], but did not differ in their motivation to 
perform well in it, p = .569. There were no differences in 
positive or negative affect, all p’s > .20.
EEG recording and preprocessing
EEG signals were recorded from 128 BioSemi active 
electrodes (www.biosemi.com) with a sampling rate of 
2048  Hz. Biosemi uses a Common Mode Sense active 
electrode (CMS) and a Driven Right Leg passive electrode 
(DRL) as two as ground electrodes. Four additional elec-
trodes measured horizontal and vertical eye-movement.
Pre-processing and statistical analyses were done using 
SPM8 for EEG (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). SPM 
provides a unitary framework for the analysis of neurosci-
ence data acquired with different technologies, including 
EEG [47, 48]. In a first step, data were offline re-referenced 
to average reference. To identify artifacts caused by sac-
cades (horizontal) or eye blinks (vertical), virtual channels 
were created from the electrooculographic electrodes and 
then subtracted from the EEG. Data were then downsam-
pled to 250 Hz and band-pass filtered from 0.166 to 30 Hz 
with a fifth-order zero phase Butterworth filter. Filtered 
data were segmented from 100 ms before stimulus onset 
until 1000 ms after stimulus presentation. 100 ms before 
stimulus onset were used for baseline-correction. Auto-
matic artifact detection was used for trials exceeding a 
threshold of 150 µV. Data were averaged, using the robust 
averaging algorithm of SPM8, excluding possible further 
artifacts. The idea of robust averaging is that for each 
channel and each time point outliers are down-weighted. 
An advantage of this approach is that clean averages can 
be calculated without having clean trials as artifacts are 
supposed to not consistently overlap and distort only 
parts of the trials. We used the recommended offset of 
the weighting function, which preserves approximately 
95  % of the data points drawn from a random Gaussian 
distribution [48]. Overall, 8.10  % of all electrodes were 
interpolated by the recorded activity of all other channels 
by spherical spline interpolation [49, 50] and 18.85  % of 
all trials were rejected, leaving on average 32.46 trials per 
block.
Source reconstructions of the generators of significant 
ERP differences were generated and statistically assessed 
with SPM8 for EEG (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) 
following recommended procedures. First, a realistic 
boundary element head model (BEM) was derived from 
the SPM’s template head model based on the MNI brain. 
The standard coordinates for all electrode positions then 
were transformed to match the template head, which is 
thought to generate reasonable results even when individ-
ual subjects head differ from the template [48]. To this aim, 
average electrode positions as provided by BioSemi were 
co-registered with the cortical mesh template for source 
reconstruction. Group inversion [51] was computed and 
the multiple sparse priors algorithm implemented in 
SPM8 was applied. This method allows activated sources 
to vary in the degree of activity, but restricts the activated 
sources to be the same in all subjects [51]. Compared to for 
single subjects, this is thought to result in superior source 
estimation. For source reconstruction, frequency contents 
between 0.166 and 30  Hz were analyzed [48]. For each 
analyzed time window, three-dimensional source recon-
structions were generated as NIFTI images. These images 
were smoothed using an 8 mm full-width half-maximum 
kernel (voxel size = 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm). Since we had 
to use all sensors for our source estimation [52], it has to 
be noted, that the number of interpolated electrodes might 
also have influenced our source estimation results.
Statistical analyses
BIAT results
In order to test whether participants differed in manifest 
faking success as a function of experimental condition, a 
repeated measures ANOVA (condition: baseline, ‘normal’ 
faking and ego depletion faking) was calculated to inves-
tigate main effects for the resulting D-scores. Planned 
contrasts (pairwise comparisons) were used to investi-
gate significant effects’ (p < .05) directions of differences.
EEG data analyses
EEG scalp-data were analyzed with EMEGS [http://www.
emegs.org/; 53]. For statistical analyses 2 (block: dop-
ing +  like vs. doping + dislike) × 3 (condition: baseline 
vs. ‘normal’ faking vs. ego depletion faking) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were set-up to investigate interac-
tion effects in time windows and electrode clusters of 
interest. Whenever Mauchlys Test of Sphericity was vio-
lated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections of the degrees of 
freedom were performed. Effect sizes for repeated meas-
ures were calculated for all effects [54]. Time windows 
and electrode clusters were segmented similar to Schin-
dler, Wolff and colleagues [17]. Time windows were seg-
mented from 150 to 200 ms to N1/P2 effects, from 200 
to 300  ms to investigate P2/N2 effects and from 250 to 
400 ms to investigate P3 effects and from 500 to 700 ms 
to investigate LPP effects. However, the topographi-
cal information about significant interactions between 
block and condition were plotted (see Additional file  4: 
Figure S1), and an additional time window from 120 to 
150 ms was segmented to investigate parietal P1 effects. 
The selected electrode clusters for all investigated com-
ponents are displayed in Fig. 2.
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Statistical tests for source estimations were calculated 
for significant scalp interaction time windows. In source 
space, within significant interactions, post hoc tests were 
calculated between the doping +  like and doping + dis-
like block for each condition. A threshold of p  <  .005 
[e.g., see 55–57] with a minimum of 25 significant voxels 
[56, 57] was applied. The identification of involved brain 
regions was performed using the AAL atlas [58].
Results
Behavioral results
Faking in both the ‘normal’ and the depleted faking con-
dition is most likely to occur by responses slowing on the 
doping + like block and normal performance in the dop-
ing + dislike block. However, since participants were not 
given an explicit strategy, we cannot be sure what strat-
egy they used, or if they used a strategy at all. However, 
supporting that our faking instruction yielded the desired 
effect, participants’ response times in the BIAT’s ‘dop-
ing  +  like’ block were slower when they were asked to 
try faking a negative attitude to doping compared to the 
baseline BIAT (see Fig. 3). A repeated measures ANOVA 
on the participants’ raw reaction times revealed a sig-
nificant interaction between condition and block [F(1.46, 
30.62) = 9.18, p = .002, ηp2 = 304]. Within baseline condi-
tion no differences between the doping +  like and dop-
ing + dislike were found (p =  .291). In contrast, slower 
responses were given in the doping + like block both for 
‘normal’ faking (p = .011) and depleted faking (p = .002).
For the participants’ D-scores, similarly a repeated 
measures ANOVA showed that participants were 
successful at faking a negative doping attitude on the 
doping BIAT [F(2, 42)  =  13.04, p  <  .001, ηp2  =  .383]. 
Planned simple contrast analyses showed that the 
D-scores in the depletion condition and in the non-
depletion condition were significantly higher than base-
line D-scores, [F(1, 21) = 18.40, p < .001, partial η2 = .467], 
and [F(1, 21) = 8.57, p = .008, ηp2 = .290] respectively. This 
indicates that our manipulation worked and participants 
were able to fake an artificially negative attitude to dop-
ing. Interestingly, a comparison between the two faking 
conditions showed a more negative D-score under ego 
depletion compared to ‘normal’ faking [F(1, 21)  =  7.85, 
p = .011, partial η2 = .272].
EEG results
Centro‑parietal sensor cluster
Over centro-parietal locations, a significant interaction 
between (block: doping +  like vs. doping + dislike) and 
condition (condition: baseline, ego depletion faking, ‘nor-
mal’ faking) was found already at the P1 [F(2,42) =  6.00, 
p =  .005, ηp2 =  .222; see Fig. 4]. However, post hoc tests 
did not find significant differences within any condi-
tion. In tendency, the doping +  like of the ‘normal’ fak-
ing condition elicited a larger negativity compared to the 
doping +  dislike block [Mdoping+like-doping+dislike = −0.23, 
t(1,21) = −1.49, p =  .151, d = −0.18, 95  %  CI −0.55 to 
+0.09], while for the depletion doping  +  like block a 
slightly larger positivity was found for this comparison 
[Mdoping+like-doping+dislike  =  0.16, t(1,21)  =  1.43, p  =  .168, 
d = 0.13, 95 % CI −0.07 to +0.40]. Finally, for the base-
line condition a similarly larger positivity was found for 
the doping  +  like block [Mdoping+like-doping+dislike  =  0.23, 
t(1,21) = 1.93, p = .068, d = 0.19, 95 % CI −0.02 to +0.48].
Regarding the late stages, in the P3 time window (250–
400  ms), a trend for a significant interaction between 
Fig. 2 Selected electrode clusters for all investigated components
Fig. 3 Mean reaction time in each block depicted for each condition. 
The D-score reflects the standardized mean difference between the 
doping + like and the doping + dislike blocks. Error Bars represent 
standard deviations
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block and condition was found [F(2,42) =  2.63, p =  .084 
ηp2  =  .111]. This interaction became significant in the 
LPP time window (500–700 ms; see Fig. 4; F(2,42) = 5.06, 
p =  .011 ηp2 =  .194). Post-hoc tests showed, that at this 
time window a significant decreased LPP was observed 
for the doping + like block of the ‘normal’ faking condi-
tion compared to the doping + dislike block [Mdoping+like-
doping+dislike = −0.65, t(1,21) = −2.16, p = .043, d = −0.39, 
95 % CI −1.28 to −0.02]. In contrast, there were no differ-
ences between the two blocks in the ego depletion faking 
condition [Mdoping+like-doping+dislike  =  0.35, t(1,21)  =  1.32, 
p  =  .201, d  =  0.19, 95  %  CI −0.20 to +0.89]. Finally, 
no differences could be found between the two blocks 
of the baseline BIAT [Mdoping+like-doping+dislike  =  0.27, 
t(1,21) = 1.14, p = .265, d = 0.17, 95 % CI −0.22 to +0.75].
Frontal sensor cluster
Between 150 and 200  ms, over frontal regions, no inter-
action was found for the frontal P2 [F(2,42)  =  0.53, 
p =  .592, ηp2 =  .025]. For the subsequently occurring N2, 
between 200 to 300  ms, again no significant block by 
condition interaction was found [F(2,42) =  0.51, p =  .542, 
ηp2  =  .029]. However, descriptively the expected nega-
tivity for the supposed faking block (doping  +  like) was 
most pronounced for the ‘normal’ faking condition 
(Mdoping+like-doping+dislike  =  −0.64  µV) compared to ego 
Fig. 4 Results for the P1 and LPP time windows over parietal regions. a Difference topographies (doping + like-doping + dislike) for the faking 
conditions: blue color indicates more negativity and red color more positivity for the supposed faking block. b Mean amplitudes in microvolt over 
the centro-parietal electrode cluster for the P1 and LPP. Error bars represent ±2 times the standard error of the mean. c Selected electrode PPOz 
displaying the time course over parietal sites
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depletion faking (Mdoping+like-doping+dislike = −0.28  µV) and 
baseline condition (Mdoping+like-doping+dislike = −0.25 µV).
Occipital sensor cluster
Over occipital sensors, no interaction between block 
and condition occurred regarding the occipital N1 
[150–200 ms; F(2,42) = 0.04, p =  .964, ηp2 =  .002], as well 
as the occipital P2 [200–300 ms; F(2,42) = 0.44, p =  .650, 
ηp2 = .020].
Source analyses
Source analyses were calculated for the significant inter-
action effects in scalp space. However, no differences in 
differences for cortical generators could be observed for 
the P1 interaction. In contrast, in the LPP time window 
(500–700 ms) a significant interaction was also found in 
source space (see Fig. 5; Table 1).
Post-hoc tests showed that enhanced activity was found 
for the supposed faking block (doping + like) in the ‘normal’ 
faking condition. For the faking block, enhanced activity 
was found in the bilateral middle temporal gyri/temporo-
parietal junction. No differences were found for the base-
line condition and the ego depletion faking condition.
Discussion
Our studies goal was twofold: First, we were interested in 
the ERP correlates of IAT faking when participants were 
not provided with an effective faking strategy. Second, we 
assessed how the ERP’s of faking differed when partici-
pants were high or low (i.e., ego depleted) in temporarily 
available self-control resources.
Behaviorally, participants were able to fake a more neg-
ative D-score in both faking conditions compared to the 
baseline. Somewhat surprisingly, the D-score under ego 
depletion was even more negative compared to ‘normal’ 
faking. Regarding ERPs, we found a significant interac-
tion between block and condition already for the parietal 
P1 component. Post-hoc tests did not reveal significant 
differences within the respective conditions. However, 
for the supposed faking block in the ‘normal’ faking con-
dition a descriptively smaller P1 was elicited, while for 
both the ego depletion faking condition and the baseline 
condition the reverse pattern was found. For such early 
components, differences are rarely found for perceptually 
identical stimuli. This might indicate that faking influ-
ences already very early time points, channeling later fak-
ing related cognitive processes. Of course one should be 
aware, that we did not expect this interaction and there-
fore such early effects need to be replicated.
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the pattern of results 
matches those found at the late time window (see Fig. 4b). 
In the P300 time window, there was only a trend for an 
interaction between block and condition. Importantly, 
in the later occurring LPP time window the interaction 
term became significant. Within the faking condition 
there was a significantly decreased amplitude for the sup-
posed faking block (doping + like) in the ‘normal’ faking 
condition. The present data show that for uninstructed 
‘normal’ BIAT faking the decrease in the late parietal 
amplitudes is similar to instructed BIAT faking [17]. 
Further, this pattern seems to be present already at the 
P1. We previously noted, that LPP modulations seem to 
Fig. 5 Significant differences in source activity for ‘normal’ faking (t-contrasts). The faking block is displayed in italics. In the time window from 500 
to 700 ms, more activity was be observed over the bilateral middle temporal gyri/temporoparietal junction for faking
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be preceded by earlier sensory differences, but are bet-
ter predictors of IAT performance [59]. In contrast, post 
hoc tests did not reveal differences between baseline or 
ego depletion blocks. For these conditions it seems that 
the doping + like block elicited larger amplitudes. In the 
LPP time window the ego depletion faking condition 
appears to be more similar to the baseline condition than 
compared to the ‘normal’ faking condition (see Fig. 4b). 
This finding could be related to a reduced ability to exert 
cognitive control in a state of ego depletion, as pro-
posed by some researchers [34]. However, one should be 
aware that we found no differences in the faking success 
between both faking conditions. Since we regard shifts in 
the D-score as an indicator of faking success, we might 
even conclude that faking success was higher under ego 
depletion. To explain the difference between our behavio-
ral and neuronal data, one might speculate that different 
brain activation patterns can lead to similar behavioral 
outcomes. This relates well to a recent review, which dis-
cusses evidence for compensatory brain activation under 
ego depletion [32]. However, another important reason 
for these differences is that ERPs and reaction times are 
essentially different measures. The ERP responses are 
direct measures of the processing of the presented vis-
ual stimuli. Here, next to the primary sensory process-
ing, various other processing tasks modulate the ERP 
amplitudes, for example the response selection, response 
preparation and motor execution (and during faking an 
inhibition/delay of the response). On the other hand, 
reaction times are the very end of this process. Neverthe-
less, combining behavioral and neuronal measures might 
help to understand why sometimes differences are found 
under ego depletion, while sometimes no differences can 
be observed.
It should be mentioned, that in the absence of inhibi-
tory tasks, slower responding has been found to 
affect late components like the P3 [60]. Here, smaller 
amplitudes are reported for faster compared to slower 
subjects [60]. Moreover, on the individual level, fast com-
pared to slow responses were found to elicit a slightly 
earlier peaking P3 [60]. This complicates direct com-
parisons of our supposed faking blocks to the respec-
tive baseline block. Since we have a systematical reaction 
time difference between the faking and baseline dop-
ing +  like blocks (as induced by the manipulation), this 
issue cannot be eliminated by an Analysis of Covariance 
[61]. However, first we do not see a delayed peaking P3 
for the doping  +  like block during faking (cf. Fig.  4c). 
Second, since the reaction times were comparably slow 
in the two faking blocks, the differential pattern between 
‘normal’ and depleted faking cannot be explained by the 
slower response or the execution of the button press. On 
the other hand, despite differences in response speed, the 
ERPs seem quite similarly going in the ego depletion and 
baseline condition. Finally, an overall comparable pattern 
can be observed already at the P1, not considered to be 
affected by slower responses.
In source space, an enhanced activity for faking in the 
bilateral middle temporal gyri/TPJ could be found within 
the ‘normal’ faking condition. This region has been 
reported to be more active during forced-choice faking 
[24]. However, as enhanced TPJ activity is also related to 
attention [62] and intentional action execution [63, 64] it 
has been previously interpreted to reflect the monitoring 
of the planned faking response [17]. However, TPJ activ-
ity is not restricted to attention and executive control. It 
has shown to play a role in a wide variety of domains such 
as theory of mind [65, 66], as well as in social cognition 
[67]. It has been suggested that the TPJ plays a role in 
both social cognitive specific as well as unspecific atten-
tion an memory processes [68]. No differences in activ-
ity were found for faking in right-inferior frontal regions 
[17], possibly due to a reduced signal to noise ratio for 
these estimations.
Table 1 Source analyses for significant scalp effects
Differences between the doping + like and doping + dislike block were calculated within significant interaction terms
No. of sig. voxels per cluster = number of significant voxels for each cluster. unc = uncorrected p value. Each cluster may exhibit more than one peak, while only the 
largest peak is displayed. Peak coordinates are displayed in MNI space (x, y and z). The identification of area labels for each peak was performed using the AAL-atlas. 
R/L = right or left hemisphere. The faking block is displayed in italics
No. of sig. voxels per cluster Peak F(2/126) Peak p (unc) MNI space coordinates AAL
x (mm) y (mm) z (mm) Area label
Interaction block*condition
 63 6.37 =.002 52 −70 8 Middle occipital R
 115 6.10 =.003 −52 −66 12 Middle temporal L
Post-hoc ‘normal’ faking doping + like > doping + dislike
 29 2.81 =.003 50 −70 10 Middle occipital R
 91 2.69 =.004 −54 −64 8 Middle temporal L
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Source estimation results might also indicate a differ-
ential cerebral processing in the two faking conditions 
[32]. However, while for example Friese et al. [33] found 
decreased activity in the right lateral prefrontal cortex, 
we found no differences between the ego depletion fak-
ing and non-faking block. This might be due to the lower 
spatial resolution of the source estimations compared to 
fMRI measures. Depletion effects might lead to a reduc-
tion of activity within some parts of executive networks 
[32], although present source estimations may not be 
able to capture these changes. Further some studies sug-
gest that under ego depletion increased activations can 
be found which are supposed to reflect compensatory 
effort [69, 70]. Although we did not find differences in 
source space on a reasonable threshold, compensatory 
activations within some parts of executive network might 
account for the discrepancy between ERPs for ‘normal’ 
and ego depleted faking.
On the other hand, in contrast to previously reported 
modulations of early frontal and occipital components 
[59], we did not find substantial differences, neither for 
depleted nor for ‘normal’ faking. Descriptively, partici-
pants in the ‘normal’ faking condition showed a negativ-
ity over frontal and positivity over occipital sensors in 
the supposed faking block (doping +  like). However, the 
insignificant interaction prohibited post hoc testing. An 
explanation might be the increased difficulty of the task. 
So far, studies reporting such early effects have used a 
very simple faking task for the participants, providing 
an instruction how and when to fake [71]. So, by using 
such blocked designs participants could prepare how to 
respond, which might have affected even such early sen-
sory processing. In the current experiment participants 
were not provided with an explicit instruction and had to 
find a strategy on their own. This could have led to unsys-
tematic faking strategies. Thus, not all participants might 
have faked using a set response strategy. Some might have 
waited for the stimulus onset and then planed how to 
respond. In line with this interpretation, standard devia-
tions seem to be larger in the supposed faking blocks than 
in previous study on instructed faking (instructed faking 
SD = 348 ms; ‘normal’ uninstructed faking SD = 587 ms; 
ego depletion uninstructed faking SD  =  685  ms) [17]. 
Another explanation for smaller interactions is based on 
methodological reasons: In the previous study on IAT 
faking, participants were instructed to fake negative as 
well as positive doping attitudes, thus both faking condi-
tions should deviate in a different direction from baseline 
[17]. In this experiment, the expected faking block and 
direction was the same for both faking conditions.
In principle, our results suggest that there is no specific 
ERP component for faking. In accordance with the liter-
ature [13–15, 18], we think that the cognitive processes 
involved in faking modulates the ERP responses. We have 
speculated that individual and temporal differences in 
the available self-control resources might affect the cer-
ebral faking pattern. Supporting this, we found different 
EEG faking patterns for depleted and non-depleted par-
ticipants. Future research on faking components might 
profit from monitoring both state and trait self-control as 
a possible moderator variable.
In regard to the BIAT, our study shows that it can be 
faked even if participants are not provided with an effec-
tive faking strategy and when their self-control resources 
are depleted (albeit to a lesser extent than when pro-
vided with an effective faking strategy; [17]). Instructing 
participants to fake an (B)IAT and even providing them 
with a faking strategy is the standard setup of IAT fak-
ing research [e.g., 8–10]. However, it has been argued 
that although this can be a powerful design to assess the 
principal fakeability of a test, it does not reflect real world 
faking [6]. Consequently, Wolff and colleagues [6] used 
an approach were participants were only implicitly incen-
tivized to fake a BIAT: If their doping attitude—measured 
with a BIAT or a self-report measure—would exceed a 
certain (bogus) cut-off, participants would be subjected 
to a tedious anti-doping training program. This manip-
ulation led to successfully faked scores only in the self-
report measure but not in the BIAT. As such a setting is 
more likely to mirror real-world faking, it will be interest-
ing to investigate the associated ERP patterns. Even more 
so in light of our finding that effectively faked scores in 
the ‘normal’ faking and the ego depleted faking condi-
tion are associated with different electro-cortical corre-
lates. Thus, even though participants are not successful 
at faking a BIAT in an implicitly incentivized scenario, 
the ERP’s between the incentivized and the control con-
dition may still differ. Finally, in cases were faking can-
not be determined statistically from the behavioral data, 
ERPs and source reconstruction may help to distinguish 
between truth and lie.
Conclusion
Although the effect is smaller, uninstructed BIAT fak-
ing in normal state resembles previous results from 
instructed BIAT faking, both behaviorally and neu-
rophysiologically. However, our results also indicate 
that while participants succeed in faking a BIAT when 
self-control resources are temporarily depleted, the 
associated ERP patterns differ. When depleted, ERPs 
differences at early and late processing stages are simi-
lar to the baseline pattern but different from ‘normal’ 
faking results. In contrast to ‘normal’ faking, no reliable 
sources were found for faking under ego depletion. Taken 
together, our results underline the importance of further 
understanding the electrophysiological correlates of test 
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faking: The differential effect on brain and behavior may 
help to distinguish between faking and honest respond-
ing in ecologically more valid experimental setups.
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